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This paper concerns the structure of Korean business groups. We investigate the factors that 
affect a controlling shareholder’s decision regarding the structure of his business group and the 
location of its member firms, using financial and ownership data on conglomerate groups in 
Korea. We define new measures that represent the levels of vertical and circuitous structures of 
a group, and the location of member firms in the group.   
We empirically confirm that controlling shareholders strategically choose the structure of 
their business groups to secure control over the groups and to seek private benefit of control. 
The risk diversification and propping incentive of controlling shareholders is also found to 
affect the decisions. - 3 -





This paper concerns the structure of business groups. We investigate the factors that affect a 
controlling shareholder’s decision regarding the structure of his business group and the location 
of its member firms, using financial and ownership data on conglomerate groups in Korea. We 
define new measures that represent the level of vertical or circuitous ownership structure of a 
group, and the location of member firms in the group. By investigating the factors that affect 
group structure, we shed new light on the incentives of controlling shareholders in the 
management of their firms.   
A business group provides a controlling shareholder with an opportunity to diversify the 
investment risk through a portfolio of business lines, to minimize the capital requirement to 
secure control over his group, and also allows him to enjoy the private benefit of control. Even 
though it is the most important decision that a controlling shareholder of a group can make, few 
research studies have analyzed the ownership and control structure of conglomerates at the 
group level, and those that have done so have been theoretical rather than empirical studies.   
Wolfenzon (1998), Almeida and Wolfenzon (2004), and Riyanto and Toolsema (2004) 
provide theoretical models to compare vertical and horizontal structures of conglomerates, and 
show that the controlling or tunnelling incentive of an entrepreneur makes him prefer a vertical 
structure to a horizontal one. We empirically test the motivation behind the decision regarding 
group structure, and confirm that control and risk diversification incentives as well as the 
tunnelling incentive affect the structure of Korean conglomerate groups. 
Some empirical studies have compared the group structure of conglomerates at the country 
level. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), and Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) 
show that pyramidal and circuitous ownership structures are prevalent in emerging countries 
where the protection of minority shareholders is not well established. Similarly, Claessens, 
Djankov, Fan and Lang (2002), Mitton (2000), Lins (2003), Lemmon and Lins (2003), and Joh 
(2003) show that the wedge between the cash right and the control right of controlling 
shareholders negatively affects firm value. Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
(2000), and Friedman, Johnson and Mitton (2003) reveal the existence of tunnelling or propping 
among affiliated firms. 
However, their analyses do not focus on the choice of group structure, but rather on the 
discrepancy between the cash right and the control right of controlling shareholders due to a 
pyramidal structure, the ensuing conflicts of interests between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders, and their negative effects on firm value. In this paper, however, we focus 
on the step before the incurrence of tunnelling or propping, and investigate the incentives of the 
controlling family to strategically decide on the group structure or the location of member firms - 4 -
in order to pursue their private goals. 
The second part of the paper investigates the decision on the location of member firms in a 
business group. In their research on the location of member firms, Bertrand, Mehta and 
Mullainathan (2000) use the size of family ownership as a measure for the location of a member 
firm in a group, and show that, in Indian conglomerates, tunnelling goes from those firms at the 
lower level of pyramids to those firms at the higher level of pyramids, thus indirectly 
confirming that there is wealth transfer from minority shareholders to controlling shareholders. 
Similarly, Attig, Fischer and Gadhoum (2004) identify the location of a firm in Canadian 
business groups using the wedge ratio as a proxy, and check the relationship between the wedge 
and firm value.   
Unlike those studies, we measure the location of a member firm in a group using the 
investment relationship among the member firms as well as the controlling shareholder’s 
ownership, and identify the factors that affect it. We show that securing control over a business 
group and tunnelling or propping among member firms is the driving force behind the decisions 
regarding the locations of member firms in a group structure.   
An analysis on group structure or the location of a member firm in a group will shed more 
light on the driving force behind managerial decisions, and allow us to better understand the 
incentives of controlling shareholders. For example, securing control over a group and 
maximizing wealth can be two conflicting goals for a controlling shareholder, since empire 
building does not come without cost to the entrepreneur. A controlling shareholder has to 
compare the benefits of a pyramidal structure that helps him secure control over his group with 
the cost of lower firm value.   
Another issue to be considered in the choice of group structure from the perspective of the 
controlling shareholder is whether to minimize the risk of his investment or to secure maximum 
control. Given his ownerships in his member firms, horizontal deployment of the firms would 
maximize the risk diversification effect, since the failure of one firm would not affect the 
performance of other member firms. However, the cost of the horizontal structure is lower 
controlling power secured by the entrepreneur.   
Another decision he will need to make is whether to have a one-way ownership structure or 
a circuitous ownership structure. Circuitous ownership allows maximum control over member 
firms, but increases the investment risks of a controlling shareholder and partially offsets his 
tunnelling effort.   
The fact that firms in emerging countries, where corporate governance and the legal system 
are not so favourable to minority shareholders, tend to have a pyramidal structure suggests that 
the private benefit effect of control that increases with a pyramidal structure dominates the 
lower firm value or higher investment risk effect in those countries. Still, the diversity of group 
structures, as shown in Korean conglomerates, suggests that controlling shareholders generally 
face the decision of choosing an optimal group structure, and that different group characteristics 
can result in different decisions. Our analysis on the determining factors of the structure of a - 5 -
group or the location of member firms in the group will show what factors dominate the 
controlling shareholders’ decision. 
For the analysis, we use financial and ownership data on Korean companies. The Korean 
economy and its companies are well known for their conglomerate business structure. Most of 
the listed companies in Korea have affiliates, and an independent firm in its pure sense is rather 
the exception in the Korean economy. Jang, Kang and Park (2004) report that more than 95% of 
the manufacturing companies listed on the Korea Stock Exchange as of the end of 2003 had 
affiliated companies. Also, most of the listed companies on the Korea Stock Exchange have 
controlling shareholders, a feature that differentiates them from the keiretsu of Japan. For 
example, in the same paper, Jang, Kang and Park (2004) identified controlling shareholders for 
364 out of 425 Korean manufacturing firms sampled.
1 The controlling shareholders of Korean 
firms actively participate in the management of their companies as well as dominating the board 
of directors, and so they are properly termed ‘owner-managers’.   
Another motive behind our investigation of the group structure of Korean conglomerates 
comes from the fact that we can observe very diverse forms of conglomerate structure in the 
economy. For example, the Samsung group, which includes Samsung Electronics as a member 
firm, has a very vertical and circuitous ownership structure. On the other hand, the Anam Group 
has more horizontal and non-circuitous ownership structure. The structures of some groups have 
also changed over time so that the LG group, for example, used to be very vertical and 
circuitous in its group structure in 1997, but now has a horizontal structure where most of its 
member firms are directly owned by a holding company.       
To analyse the determination of a group structure, we need detailed data on the ownership 
structure of all the member firms of a group, including both listed companies and non-listed 
companies. In this paper, we use the data source identified by the Korea Fair Trade Commission, 
which regularly collects ownership and transaction data of Korean groups for the purpose of 
anti-trust  control.    
In Section 2, which follows this introduction, we discuss empirical hypotheses based on 
existing theories and inductive discussions. In Section 3, we develop and define the measures 
that represent the level of vertical structure of a group, the level of circuitous ownership 
structure of a group and the location of a member firm in the overall group structure. Section 4 
provides an overview of the ownership and business structure of Korean groups, and Section 5 
empirically investigates the decision factors relating to group structure and firm location, and 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Empirical Hypotheses 
 
In this section, we derive empirical hypotheses for empirical models based on existing 
†††††††††††††††††††††
1  A few exceptions are commercial banks, and privatized public corporations such as KT and POSCO. - 6 -
theories and discussions. As the paper investigates the choice of group structure and the choice 
of the positions of individual firms in a group structure, we discuss them separately. 
 
2.1. Group Characteristics and Group Structure   
 
We assume that a controlling shareholder has two dimensions of decisions to make 





According to existing research, the wealth constraint of a controlling shareholder is a major 
reason why we can observe pyramidal or circuitous structures as they allow a controlling 
shareholder to secure control over his group firms with a minimum of his own investments. We 
assume that a controlling shareholder wants to control a large group of firms, since it provides 
him with both economic and non-economic benefits of control. There are five variables we 
consider to test the hypothesis.   
The first variable is the ownership of a controlling shareholder and his family. In general, a 
controlling family will prefer a vertical or circuitous structure, since it minimizes the family’s 
investments needed to secure control over its group. However, the preference for a vertical or 
circuitous structure would be traded off against lower firm value, as Claessens et al. (2002) 
demonstrate, and lower firm value would be more costly for controlling families with higher 
ownership. We expect a negative correlation between family ownership and the level of vertical 
structure or the level of circuitous structure.   
Second, the ownership of member firms, which is practically under the control of the 
controlling shareholder, helps him secure control over his group, as La Porta et al. (1999) 
demonstrate, and possibly allows him to maintain a horizontal structure. However, the effect of 
ownership by affiliated firms on the group structure is not easy to measure, since, by definition, 
affiliated ownership is an endogenous variable decided by the group structure itself. That is, the 
more vertical a group structure is, the higher the affiliated ownership tends to be.   
Third, we use the number of affiliated firms as the proxy for the difficulty in raising family 
wealth to be invested in affiliated firms since the family usually has a limited wealth and faces 
more wealth constraint as the group expands. We expect a positive correlation between the 
number of affiliated firms and the level of vertical structure or the level of circuitous structure 
under the control hypothesis, since more affiliated firms requires more family wealth to 
maintain its control over a group.   
Fourth, the proportion of listed firms in the group will also affect the group structure, and its 
effect can move in two directions. The larger the proportion is, the harder it will be for a 
controlling shareholder to secure control over the group, since, by definition, there will be more - 7 -
outside investors. In this case, the controlling shareholder would resort to a vertical or circuitous 
structure to secure control, and we expect a positive correlation between the proportion of listed 
firms and the level of vertical or circuitous structure.   
On the other hand, if a member firm goes public and the shares issued to outside investors 
are widely spread, the controlling shareholder can expand the size of his group and still control 
his member firms with lower ownership. Thus, listing allows the controlling shareholder to 
redeploy his investments to secure the control of other member firms. In this case, we expect a 
negative correlation between the proportion of listed firms and the level of vertical or circuitous 
structure.   
Fifth, the existence of a large, dominant company in the group will help the controlling 
shareholder to secure control over the group, since all he needs to do is obtain the controlling 
ownership of the dominant holding company as Jang, Kang and Park (2004) show. We expect a 
negative correlation between the existence of a holding company and the level of vertical or 
circuitous structure. Family ownership in the holding company is also taken into consideration.   
As another proxy for the existence of dominant companies, we calculate a Herfindahl index 
for a group, where the index is defined as the sum of the squares of the proportion of the equity 
size of each member firm to the total equity of the group. A larger Herfindahl index implies the 
existence of dominant firms, and we expect a negative correlation between the index and the 
level of vertical or circuitous structure. 
Sixth, if the holding company is listed, it can also be an easy target for an M&A, and the 
control over the group can be challenged. The existence of a listed holding company will lead to 
a higher level of circuitous structure to protect the listed holding company and the group.   
 
Risk Diversification Hypothesis   
 
As Amihud and Lev (1981) argue, managers prefer to expand their business into non-related 
areas to diversity their investment risk. For the purpose of group risk diversification, a 
horizontal structure where the controlling shareholder owns the shares of each firm directly, or 
owns the shares of a holding company that owns the shares of member firms, will be preferred. 
Circuitous ownership among affiliated firms would increase the possibility of contagious 
failures of member firms, and therefore will be shunned if the group risk is high.     
To measure the risk of controlling shareholders, we use the proportion of firms that are in a 
related business based on two-digit industry classifications, and the standard deviation of group 
profitability (return on assets) as the proxies for the risk of a group. We expect that groups with 
higher business risk would tend to have a horizontal structure or a non-circuitous ownership 
structure.  
Family ownership will also affect the decision regarding the structure of a group from the 
risk diversification point of view. The larger it is, the more the family would prefer to have a 
horizontal structure to minimize its investment risk. - 8 -
 
Tunnelling and/or Propping Hypothesis 
 
Many studies, including Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2000), Classens 
et al. (2000);,Friedman, Johnson and Mitton (2003), and Almeida and Wolfenzon (2004) show 
that a pyramidal or circuitous structure is closely related to the tunnelling or propping incentives 
of controlling shareholders. When there are ownership relations among member firms – that is, 
when there is a vertical or circuitous structure – it will be easier for the firms to expropriate or 
subsidize one another. On the other hand, for the controlling shareholder who wants to 
expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders, a circuitous structure reduces the tunnelling 
effect, since more of the cost of tunnelling will ultimately be imposed on the controlling 
shareholder.  
The first variable to test tunnelling or propping hypothesis is the free cash flow of the group, 
which is measured by EBITDA in the empirical model. Since a controlling shareholder has 
more to gain from a vertical structure, as Almeida and Wolfenzon (2004) show, we expect a 
higher free cash flow to be correlated with a higher incidence of a vertical or circuitous structure.   
The proportion of listed firms in the group will also affect the tunnelling incentive of the 
controlling shareholder. As Cheung et al. (2004) show, a controlling shareholder prefers to 
transfer wealth from listed firms to non-listed firms in his group. Accordingly, we expect that 
the larger the number or the proportion of listed firms in a group is, the more a vertical or 
circuitous structure would be preferred, since tunnelling is easier and the costs of tunnelling will 
be shared more by minority investors. In the same vein, we expect that ownership by the 
controlling family will be negatively correlated with the level of vertical or circuitous structure 
under the tunnelling hypothesis, as opposed to the control hypothesis.   
The difference in the size of family ownership of group firms also functions as a 
background for tunnelling. We conjecture that the larger the difference is, the larger incentive 
for tunnelling the controlling family has. Accordingly, a more vertical or circuitous structure 
will be preferred to expedite the transfer of wealth. On the other hand, the difference in the 
performance or liquidity of member firms would increase the necessity for propping, and would 
lead to a more vertical or circuitous structure. We use the standard deviation of ROAs or  
EBITDAs of member firms to measure the difference in the performance of member firms. 
   
Internal Capital Market Hypothesis 
 
The provision of internal capital is an important function of a business group, as Almeida 
and Wolfenzon (2004) show. If a business group has financial institutions as its affiliates, or if 
the size of the free cash flow in the group tends to be higher, they will find it easier to finance - 9 -
their investments without resorting to external capital markets.
2 In this case, a controlling 
shareholder will prefer a pyramidal or circuitous structure, as it allows him more flexibility in 
deploying internally financed capital among member firms. We also expect that larger 
difference in the performance or liquidity of member firms would necessitate a vertical or 
circuitous structure that will facilitate the provision of internal capital.   
The debt ratio of a group will also affect the group structure. The larger the leverage is, the 
more a group will prefer a vertical or circuitous structure, which tends to enlarge the equity base 
of member firms. 
 
Efficiency (Vertical Integration) Hypothesis 
 
A business group whose member firms are mostly in related businesses may prefer a 
vertical structure to allow vertical integration between upstream and downstream firms, and to 
obtain a higher level of operational efficiency (Chang, 2003). Using the level of business 
concentration as defined above, we expect a positive correlation between this level and the level 
of vertical structure.   
 
2.2. Firm Characteristics and the Position of Member Firms 
 
The group structure only shows the level of vertical or circuitous ownership structure but 
does not show where and why a member firm is located in the pyramid. In this section, we 
identify the factors that will affect the location of a member firm in a group and derive empirical 
hypotheses to be tested. Depending on the objective of a controlling shareholder, firm 




The size of the wealth of the controlling family will affect the decision regarding the 
location of a member firm in a group. Other things being equal, a controlling shareholder can 
maximize his control rights by placing those firms of which he owns relatively more shares on a 
higher level of the pyramid. We expect that the larger is the ownership of the controlling family, 
the higher is the position of a member firm in a pyramid.
3  
†††††††††††††††††††††
2 Korean business groups own a wide range of non-bank financial institutions such as securities 
companies, insurance companies and credit card companies, and there is evidence that these financial 
institutions expedite the financing of affiliated companies. For example, it is widely known that securities 
companies that belong to business groups have implicit barter contracts among them where they provide 
underwriting services for non-affiliated companies of competing business groups under the regulatory 
restriction on the service to affiliated companies. 
3 Inversely, we can also conjecture that controlling family will try to own more of the shares of those 
firms at the higher level of a pyramid, which is discussed in Jang, Kang and Park (2004). In this case, we 
would observe that tunnelling tend to go from those firms at the lower level of a pyramid to those firms at - 10 -
For the purpose of control, firms of larger asset size, larger free cash flow, larger investment 
amount in affiliated firms, longer years in business or lower debt ratio would also be located on 
the higher level of a pyramid and play the role of an operating holding company, since they 
have the capital to invest in their affiliated firms. The financial stability of dominant companies 
in a group is also important, since a financially distressed holding company can be a serious 
threat to the control of a group.   
Whether a member firm is listed or not will also affect the decision. It is easier for listed 
firms to finance investments in affiliated firms, and so they tend to be located on the higher 
level of a pyramid. On the other hand, if it is not easy to secure control over a listed firm since 
the controlling family has, by definition, a smaller ownership of listed firms, it will be placed on 
the lower level of a pyramid.   
 
Tunnelling Hypothesis   
 
The tunnelling hypothesis predicts that firms with larger free cash flow, higher profitability 
or a lower debt ratio can be located on the lower level of a pyramid, since these firms have 
corporate resources that can be diverted to other upstream firms, as Bertrand et al. and Attig et 
al. (2004) show. Note that this prediction is opposite to that predicted by the control hypothesis 
above.    
Another variable we can think of in terms of tunnelling is whether a member firm is listed 
or not. Cheung et al. (2004) define tunnelling as a transaction between member firms that hurts 
the interests of minority shareholders, and propping as a transaction that benefits them. We 
expect that listed member firms will tend to be located on the lower level of a pyramid if 
tunnelling is a more dominant factor than propping, which is again opposite to what the control 




Friedman et al. (2003) and Riyanto and Toolsema (2004) make a case for propping, or 
negative tunnelling, by firms on the higher level of a group pyramid to affiliated firms in 
financial trouble. We expect that firms with higher profitability, a lower debt ratio and larger 
free cash flow will be located on the higher level of a pyramid, which is opposite to what the 
tunnelling hypothesis predicts.   
The controlling shareholder will also locate a member firm that requires a large capital 
investment in a new project on the lower level of a pyramid, as Almeida and Wolfenzon (2004) 
argue. We expect that member firms with higher investment growth rates or large R&D 
investment will be located on the lower level of a pyramid.   
†††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††† †††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††
the higher level, as Bertrand et al. (2000) argue. We deal with the endogeneity issue in Section 5. - 11 -
We also expect that transactions between affiliated firms, such as sales or debt guarantees, 
will affect the location of member firms depending on the dominance of the tunnelling or 
propping incentives of a controlling family. 
†
3. Definitions of Structural Measures 
 
   In this section, we develop measures that will measure the location of member firms in a 
business group, and the vertical or circuitous structure of a business group. 
 
3.1. Measures of the Position of a Member Firm 
 
To identify the position of a member firm in a group, we define the following measure. 
 
The location of a firm in a group = (Number of direct and indirect investments in other 
member firms) / (Number of direct and indirect investments in other member firms + 
Number of direct and indirect ownerships of the firm by other member firms) 
 
The number of direct investments denotes the sum of the numbers of direct investments in 
the shares of affiliated firms by the subject firm (see Figure 1 below for examples). The number 
of indirect investments denotes the sum of the numbers of indirect investments in the shares of 
affiliated firms through other member firms. To measure the number of direct and indirect 
investments, we identify every chain of investments of a member firm, count the number of 
direct and indirect investments  on each chain, and sum the numbers. The measure usually 
double counts the number of direct and indirect investments when there is more than one chain 
of investments for a member firm.
4 
One complication occurs when an investment chain is circuitous. In this case, we assume 
that the investment chain stops right before the circuitous investment occurs, and count the 
number of direct and indirect investments in the chain. For example, in Figure 1, firm A has two 
chains of investments in other member firms. One chain of investments goes to firm B, firm C 
and firm D which invests in firm A again. It being circuitous, we assume the investment chain 
stops at firm D, and the number of direct and indirect investments amounts to three in the chain. 
Another chain of investments goes to firm B, firm C, and stops at firm E, with the number of 
direct and indirect investments amounting to three in the chain. Therefore, the total number of 
†††††††††††††††††††††
4 To identify the chains of investments in a business group, we start with the ownership data for each 
member firm, and identify the affiliated corporate shareholders with more than 1% of ownership. Then, 
using the merge function of the SAS program, we identify all the chains of investments for each member 
firm until there is no more investment in another member firm, or until it leads to a circuitous ownership, 
and count the numbers of direct and indirect investments on all the investment chains identified. In our 
counting, the number of the chains of investments for each member firm is equal to the number of direct 
investments of the firm. - 12 -
direct and indirect investments is six for firm A according to our definition.   
The number of direct and indirect ownerships of the firm by other member firms is also 
calculated by identifying all the chains of ownerships that leads to the firm, and counting the 
number of firms in the chains. In the example, there is just one chain of ownerships that leads to 
firm A where firm B owns firm C, which owns firm D, which owns firm A. Therefore the 
number of direct and indirect ownerships for firm A is three. 
 









Number of direct 
investments(I) 
Number of indirect 
investments (II) 
Number of ownerships 
by other firms (III) 
Location of a firm
((I+II)/(I+II+III))
Firm A  2  4  3  0.67 
Firm B  2  3  3  0.63 
Firm C  2  2 3  0.57 
Firm D  2  5  3  0.70 
Firm E  0  0  4  0 
 
An index value of 1 implies that the firm is on the top of the pyramid, so it only invests in 
other member firms but no member firm invests in it. An index value of 0 implies the reverse of 
this. Of course, there can be multiple firms in a group that have an index value of 1 or 0. The 
index tends to be higher if a firm invests in more of other member firms, and tends to be lower 
when more member firms invest in the firm. It also tends to be higher when a firm invests in 
other member firms which tend to have more subsidiaries. This is why, in the example, firm D 
has the largest index even though firm A, B, C, and D are all on a chain of circuitous ownership. 
It eventually owns firm C which has a subsidiary, firm E.   
We interpret that a higher index value implies that the firm is located at a higher level of a 
pyramid in a group. According to the control hypothesis, the controlling family of the group 
would own more of the shares of firm A since it will maximize its control over the group given 
the same amount of its capital. 
We find that the number of the investment chains increases geometrically with the number 
of member firms in a group. For example, LG Construction Co. of the LG group has the largest 
number of direct investments of 79,940, and the largest indirect investments of 857,100 in 1997. 
Firm E Firm C Firm B
Firm A Firm D- 13 -
Considering that the LG group has 46 member firms in 1997, it implies that LG Construction 
Co. has approximately 1,776 (79,940/45) different paths of investments that lead to a member 
firm in the group. 
 
2.2. Measures of Group Structure 
 
In this section, we define the measures that would represent the level of vertical structure, or 
the level of circuitous ownership of a group.   
 
Vertical Structure = 1 – (Total number of direct investments)/(Total number of direct 
and indirect investments) 
 
This index measures how vertically member firms are deployed in a pyramid. We use the 
definition since we found that the relative number of direct and indirect investments changes 
monotonically with the level of vertical structure. The index will be higher, the more vertically 
member firms are located, and the index approaches 1 as all the member firms are located on a 
vertical chain of ownership. In Figure 1 above, the value of the index is 7/11 (1-(8/22)) (see 
Appendix 1 for other examples). The index attains a value of 0 when all the member firms are 
located horizontally and owned by a holding company such that no indirect investment exists.   
  
Circuitous Structure = (Number of firms on circuitous chains of investments) / 
(Number of firms in a group) 
 
This measure counts the number of member firms that are placed on circuitous chains of 
investments and divides it by the total number of firms in a group. Of course, the index will be 
higher, the larger the number of member firms that are on circuitous chains of investments. 
However, the index, based on the number of firms on circuitous chains of investments, can be 
biased if there is a wide difference in the levels of member firms’ direct or indirect investments 
in other member firms.   
For example, depending on whether a member firm that has a relatively large number of 
direct and indirect investments is on a circuitous chain of investments or not, the level of the 
circuitous structure can be very different, but the above measure cannot reflect such a difference. 
For the sake of robustness, we define another measure of the circuitous structure. As Appendix 1 
shows, a circuitous ownership structure amplifies the vertical structure. 
 
4. Empirical Models and Data 
 
4.1. Empirical Models 
  - 14 -
We use random effect models of the panel analysis to investigate the determinants of the 
group structure.
5 Excluding those groups where no controlling family exists, we have 
unbalanced panels of the total sample of 211 groups over a seven-year period. Equation (1) 
defines the empirical model we employ, where i denotes groups, t denotes panel years (1997 
through 2003),  it x  denotes explanatory variables,  i u  denotes random effects and  it ε  
denotes residuals: 
 
it i it it u x Y ε β α + + + = '                                                ( 1 )  
 
This equation’s explanatory variables and their definitions are as follows. Total assets 
denotes the sum of the assets of member firms, and debt ratio is the ratio of the sum of the debts 
of member firms to the sum of the equities excluding stock investments by affiliated firms. 
Return on assets is the ratio of the sum of net profit to the sum of the total assets of member 
firms. We exclude financial or insurance companies in the calculation.   
The holding company of a group is defined as the firm that has the largest amount of stock 
investments in other affiliated firms in the group. Ownership by holding company is measured 
as the simple or weighted average of ownerships in affiliated firms. We also employ a dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 if the holding company is listed. The proportion of listed firms 
and the proportion of financial companies in a group are also used to reflect the financing 
capability of the group.     
The risk of a group is measured in two ways. The first is the business concentration index, 
which is defined as 1 minus the ratio of the number of business lines based on the two-digit 
Korea Standard Industrial Classification to the number of member firms in a group. The second 
measure is the standard deviation of the group ROAs over the past five years. The higher these 
numbers are, the higher the business risk of a group is. 
To measure the difference in the relative sizes of member firms, a Herfindahl index, which 
is defined as the sum of the squares of the proportion of each member firm in the total assets of 
a group, is used. A higher Herfindahl index implies that there tends to exist a large firm that 
plays the role of a holding company in a group. 
Family ownership is the weighted average of family ownerships in each member firm. We 
also employ a simple average for a check. Affiliated ownership is the weighted average of the 
ownerships by affiliated firms.
6  
For the empirical model that identifies the determinants of the location of a member firm in 
a group, we use the following specification. To control for the cross-sectional effects and time-
series effects of the panel data, we add industrial dummies based on the two-digit industrial 
†††††††††††††††††††††
5 Hausman’s (1978) specification test did not reject the null hypothesis that there is no correlation 
between independent variables and individual effects in most of the models (Hsiao, 1986). 
6 We also checked the effect of institutional or foreign ownership, but found their coefficients to be 
insignificant. - 15 -
classification, group dummies that identify a specific group and time dummies: 
 
it it t i i it x year industry group Y ε β α + + + + + = '                           ( 2 )  
 
The explanatory variables of equation (2) and their definitions are as follows. Asset size is 
defined as the log of the assets of a member firm, and debt ratio is the ratio of debt to total 
assets. ROA is the net profit to total assets, and EBITDA is measured as the ratio of operating 
profit plus depreciation to the total assets of a firm. For the age of a firm, we use the log of the 
number of years in business.   
The listing dummy takes a value of 1 if a member firm is listed, and 0 otherwise. R&D is 
the ratio of the amount of R&D expenses to total assets, and we also use the standard deviation 
of ROAs to measure the risk of a member firm. Sales to or from affiliated firms are also 
included in the model to proxy for the amount of tunnelling or propping. 
The heteroskedasticity of error terms can lead to bias in the results of the empirical tests. 
When we applied the tests for heteroskedasticity suggested by White (1980) and Breusch and 
Pagan (1979), we actually observed a serious heteroskedasticity problem. We adjusted the 
standard error terms using the White’s (1980) Consistent Covariance Matrix, and calculated test 
statistics controlled for the heteroskedasticity. 
 
4.2. Selection of Sample Groups and Firms 
 
We use the ownership and financial data on those firms that belong to Korean 
conglomerates designated by the Korea Fair Trade Commission each year as ‘large-sized 
business groups’. Firms for which the summed ownerships of a controlling shareholder, his 
family and affiliated firms exceed 30% are defined as member firms of a business group. Firms 
that do not meet these criteria but are under the actual control of the controlling family are also 
defined as members of the business group. The data include all the ownership data on the listed 
and non-listed member firms of a business group, and allow us to identify the ownership and 
investment relationships among member firms. The data period is from 1997 through 2003, with 
a total of 263 sample group-years and 5,095 sample firm-years. We exclude financial groups 
and groups with no controlling family or no financial data.
7  We obtain other financial data from 
either the KIS-2000 database or KIS-Line of Korea Credit Evaluation and Information Company, 
which provides the most extensive database for Korean companies, both listed and non-listed. 
 
4.3. Summary Statistics of Groups 
 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the sample groups. Regarding the financial data, the 
†††††††††††††††††††††
7 Firms such as Korea Telecom or POSCO that were formerly government-owned companies but had 
been privatized have no controlling families. - 16 -
average asset size of the sample groups during the period is about US$13.2 billion, with a 
maximum of US$87.5 billion, for the Samsung Group, and a minimum of US$0.95 billion. The 
average ratio of debt to assets is 0.647. The average number of member firms in a group is 22.5, 
with a maximum of 64, again for the Samsung Group, and a minimum of four for the Buyoung 
Group. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the numbers of member firms for the sample business 
groups.  
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† The groups are involved in 11.9 business areas on average, suggesting that only about two 
firms are in the same business lines according to the two-digit industrial classification. The 
average Herfindahl index is 0.229, suggesting that dominant firms often exist in a business 
group. The average ROA of the sample groups is -0.0002 with a standard deviation of 0.030 
over the past five years. The average standard deviation of the ROAs of the member firms of a 
group is 0.1884, suggesting a large difference in performance among member firms.   
Regarding the ownership data, the weighted average of the family ownership of a group is 
9.88%, with a maximum of 36.46% and a minimum of 1.11%. The weighted average ownership 
of an affiliated firm is 37.66%, suggesting that controlling families depend heavily on affiliated 
ownerships to secure control. The relatively high ownership of affiliated firms also suggests that 
the issue of group structure would be a concern to the controlling shareholders of Korean 
business groups.   
The holding company of a group, which is defined as the firm with the largest equity capital, 
provides an average of 21.5% of the total equity capital of the group, and the controlling family 
owns an average of 17.86% of its shares, which is much higher than the average family 
ownership of member firms in a group. This suggests that family ownership is concentrated in a 
few holding companies for the purpose of securing its control over the group with minimum 
investments by the family. On the other hand, holding companies are more likely to be listed so - 17 -
that 91.4% of the holding companies are listed on the exchange, while the average proportion of 
listed firms in the sample groups is only 20.6%.   
Regarding the group structure, the average value for the level of vertical structure is 0.5698, 
with a maximum of 0.91 for the Samsung Group, and a minimum of 0.0. The large standard 
deviation of 0.25 suggests that there is a wide variation in group structures among the sample 
groups. The average value of Circuitous Structure is 0.163, suggesting that about 16.3% of the 
member firms of a group are located in circuitous chains of ownership.   
Table 3 shows the changes in the averages and the medians of the summary statistics over 
the sample periods. An interesting trend is the decreasing level of the vertical structure from 
0.669 in 1997 to 0.534 in 2003. We ascribe this to the changing corporate environment in Korea 
where improved corporate governance and managerial transparency required on Korean firms 
after the Asian financial crisis made it increasingly difficult for corporate insiders to practice 
tunnelling. An interesting change is that the largest business groups in year 1997 had been 
separated into several business groups of smaller sizes as the second or third generations of their 
controlling families took the control of the groups. For example, the Samsung group has been 
separated into three independent business groups, and the Hyundai group into five independent 
business groups by the year 2003. The new business groups tend to have much lower levels of 
vertical or circuitous structure. For example, the index values of the vertical and circuitous 
structures of the LG group, which used to be 0.707 and 0.250 respectively in 1997, are 0.330 
and 0.0 respectively in 2003 as most of its member firms are directly owned by LG Holdings.     
The inside ownership, which is the sum of the ownership of the controlling family and the 
ownership of affiliated firms, also shows an increasing trend, from 0.442 in 1997 to 0.518 in 
2003. The family ownership in the holding company of a group also shows a sharp increase, 
from 0.150 in 1997 to 0.243 in 2003. These changes possibly reflect the controlling families’ 
concern about the increasing external threat to their control over their group firms.   
Other time-series data tend to be stable, except for the large drop in the debt ratio in 1999 
that was mainly due to the increased equity investments among affiliated firms when the 




4.4. Summary Statistics of Member Firms 
 
Table 4 shows the summary statistics of the firms that belong to the sample business groups 
during the period 1997 through 2003. There are about 547 firms for each year, and a total of 
2,963 sample firm-years for the final analysis. The simple average of the position indexes of all 
†††††††††††††††††††††
8 The Korea Fair Trade Commission had restricted the amount of investments in the stocks of affiliated 
firms to a maximum of 25% of their net equity capital, but deregulated it in 1999 to allow Korean 
business groups to increase their inside ownerships needed for their defence against hostile takeover 
attempts by foreign companies. - 18 -
the member firms is 0.2997, with a maximum of 1 and a minimum of 0.0. The low mean and the 
median of 0 imply that most of the member firms in Korean business groups are owned by other 
member firms, having no subsidiaries of their own. It also suggests that a typical Korean 
business group has a few holding companies that extensively invest in and control other 
affiliated firms.   
The weighted average of the position index of 0.26 is smaller than the simple average, 
which implies that the average size of those member firms located on the lower levels of a 
pyramid is larger than the average size of the member firms located on the higher levels. The 
fact that subsidiaries tend to be larger than parent companies is another interesting piece of 
evidence that the controlling families of Korean business groups wisely exploit a pyramidal 
structure for the purpose of expanding their business and controlling more corporate resources. 
The proportion of member firms that are on a circuitous chain of ownership is 0.2173, and 
1.39% even directly cross-owns the shares of affiliated companies.
9  
The proportion of listed firms is 0.2747, suggesting that most member firms are not listed. 
Table 5 compares the financial characteristics of listed and non-listed member firms. The 
average location index for listed member firms is 0.6506, which is significantly higher than the 
figure of 0.1673 for non-listed member firms. This suggests that controlling families place listed 
firms on the higher level of the pyramid and secure control over non-listed firms through the 
listed firms.   
The average proportion of investments in affiliated stocks out of equity capital is 0.1931 for 
listed firms, while it is only 0.0129 for non-listed firms. We can also confirm that most of the 
inside ownership of non-listed firms consists of the affiliated ownerships of 0.6634, which is 
much larger than the affiliated ownerships of 0.1931 for listed firms. The statistics confirm 
again that listing a member firm in a group is a very efficient way of obtaining investment 
capital to control other non-listed member firms. However, the average family ownerships of 
listed and non-listed firms, 0.0977 and 0.0903 respectively, do not show much difference 
suggesting that tunnelling may not be an issue.   
The proportions of sales and purchases that non-listed firms carried out with affiliated firms 
are 0.3098 and 0.1297 respectively, while the proportions of sales and purchases that listed 
firms carried out with affiliated firms are the lower figures of 0.1590 and 0.1077 respectively.  
On the other hand, the average EBITDA and ROAs of listed member firms are higher than those 
of non-listed member firms, while non-listed firms show much higher growth rates in fixed 
assets. These results suggest that non-listed firms depend more on affiliated firms for their 
revenues, and supports the propping hypothesis or the vertical integration hypothesis. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
†††††††††††††††††††††
9  In Korea, voting rights are restricted in cases of direct cross-ownerships. - 19 -
5.1. Choice between Vertical and Horizontal Structures 
  
In Panel A of Table 6, we show the regression results that test the control hypothesis in the 
choice of the level of vertical structure of a group.
10 The control hypothesis predicts that the 
controlling family’s incentive to secure control of its group affects the level of vertical structure. 
In regression (1), family ownership is negatively correlated to the index of vertical structure 
with the 1% significance level. This implies that the smaller the family ownership is, the more 
the controlling family prefers a vertical structure in order to secure control over the group with 
smaller family investments.   
In regression (2), ownership by affiliated firms has a positive coefficient of 0.4123, which is 
significant at the 1% level. This result does not support the control hypothesis, since we 
expected that, ceteris paribus, larger affiliated ownership would lead to a horizontal structure. 
However, as we discussed earlier, the positive correlation is partly due to the tautological 
relationship between a vertical structure and affiliated ownership. The positive coefficient does 
support the tunnelling hypothesis, though, if we interpret the affiliated ownership as 
representing the wedge between the cash right and the control right of controlling shareholders.   
In regression (3) and (4), the number of affiliated companies is positively and significantly 
correlated with the index, which is both consistent with the control hypothesis, and the vertical 
integration hypothesis. It implies that Korean business groups expand their business in a vertical 
structure to obtain higher operational efficiency of the groups and to allow easier control for 
controlling families.   
In regressions (5) and (6), the Herfindahl index and the equity proportion of holding 
company also show respective negative coefficients of -0.5400 and -0.3011, both of which are 
significant at the 5% level. These results suggest that the existence of dominant firms allows the 
group to choose a horizontal structure, and support the control hypothesis. On the other hand, in 
regression (9), the variable, proportion of listed firms, is positive and significant at the 1% level. 
This implies that a controlling family prefers to maintain a vertical structure if there are more 
listed member firms in a group, since the vertical structure allows it to secure more control over 
the group under the distributed ownership structure of listed member firms. It is also consistent 
with the tunnelling hypothesis, since wealth transfer from listed firms is less costly to the 
controlling shareholder, who thus prefers a vertical structure for tunnelling purposes. 
In regression (11), where we include all the variables, the asset size of a group has a positive 
coefficient of 0.0397, which is significant at the 1% level. This implies that Korean business 
groups expand more vertically than horizontally as their sizes grow. In the same regression, 
however, family ownership and the Herfindahl index lose their significance, suggesting that 
family ownership is not the major factor in deciding the group structure, since the controlling 
family can resort to affiliated companies to secure control over its group. Still, the overall 
†††††††††††††††††††††
10 Throughout the regressions in the paper, we controlled for the multicollinearity problem by checking 
the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values and tolerances (1/VIF). - 20 -
empirical results are consistent with the control hypothesis. 
In Panel B of Table 6, we show the regression results that test the risk diversification 
hypothesis. The basic conjecture is that a higher risk of a business group would lead to a more 
horizontal structure, which offers a better method of risk diversification. The standard deviation 
of group ROAs shows a negative coefficient of -1.8084 in regression (1), which is significant at 
the 1% level and consistent with the risk diversification hypothesis. The number of business 
lines, which represent a well-diversified business portfolio, has a positive coefficient of 0.0192 
in regression (2), which is also significant at the 1% level and consistent with the risk 
diversification hypothesis.   
On the other hand, in regression (3), the coefficient of industrial concentration is positive 
and significant at the 1% level, which is not consistent with the risk diversification hypothesis, 
but rather supports the vertical integration hypothesis. This implies that Korean business groups 
tend to pursue higher operational efficiency through a vertical integration of their business lines 
where upstream firms depend on downstream firms in related business for their materials and 
intermediary goods. In regressions (4) through (7), where these variables are simultaneously 
included together with the control variables of asset size and debt ratio, they still maintain their 
significance. The negative coefficient of family ownership in regression (7) is also consistent 
with the risk diversification hypothesis.   
The results in general suggest that the controlling families of Korean business groups care 
about their investment risk and prefer to use a horizontal structure when their investment risk is 
higher, while at the same time paying attention to maximizing the operational efficiency of their 
groups. 
Regressions (8) through (12) test the tunnelling or propping hypothesis and the functioning 
of a business group as an internal capital market. The coefficient of standard deviation of the 
cash rights of the controlling family in member firms in regression (8), which is included as a 
proxy for the tunnelling incentive of a controlling family, is not significant. But, the ownership 
of affiliated firms in regression (12), which proxies the wedge between the cash right and the 
control right of a controlling family, shows a positive coefficient that is significant at the 1% 
level. This result is consistent with the tunnelling hypothesis. The larger the wedge is, the 
stronger incentive the controlling shareholder has to divert corporate resources away for his 
private benefit of control, which can be done more easily under a vertical structure.
11 
The positive coefficients of the proportion of listed firms in a group and asset size are also 
consistent with the tunnelling hypothesis, since tunnelling usually goes from listed firms to non-
listed member firms in a group, and a larger group size offers more corporate resources to be 
diverted away for the private benefit of a controlling shareholder.   
On the other hand, the propping hypothesis is not well supported by the empirical analysis. 
†††††††††††††††††††††
11 However, we have to be careful when interpreting the result since there naturally exists a positive 
correlation between the wedge and the level of vertical structure, since the latter tends to increase the 
wedge. - 21 -
In regression (9), the standard deviation of the ROAs of member firms, which we include to test 
whether a difference in performance would lead to a vertical structure for propping purposes, is 
not correlated with the dependent variable. The proportion of financial firms and the amount of 
free cash flow are not correlated with the group structure either, thus the propping or the internal 
capital market hypotheses are not supported.   
In summary, the empirical results support, albeit to different extents, the conjectures we 
hypothesized to explain the motivations of the controlling shareholders of business groups, and 
are consistent with existing theories and empirical results.   
 
5.2. Choice of Circuitous Structure   
 
In this section, we investigate the factors that affect the choice of the level of circuitous 
structure of a group. We use two definitions for the dependent variable to measure the level of 
circuitous ownership structure. The first definition is the proportion of member firms that are on 
the circuitous chain of investments, and the second one is the ratio of the number of direct and 
indirect investments by member firms that are on the circuitous chain of investments to the 
number of the direct and indirect investments by all member firms in the group. 
Table 7 shows the regression results based on the first definition of circuitous ownership 
structure. Panel A of Table 7 tests the control hypothesis, which predicts that the controlling 
family’s incentive to secure control of its group positively affects the level of circuitous 
structure. The negative coefficient of family ownership in regression (1), which is significant at 
the 1% level, implies that lower family ownership leads to a greater degree of circuitous 
ownership structure in a group, supporting the control hypothesis. However, the positive and 
significant coefficient of affiliated ownership in regression (2) is not consistent with the control 
hypothesis, but is consistent with the tunnelling hypothesis, as was discussed previously. In 
regressions (3) and (4), the coefficient of the number of member firms in a group, which was 
significant in the regression model for the choice of vertical structure, is not significant anymore. 
In regression (5), the Herfindahl index is negatively correlated with the circuitous structure. 
This suggests that the existence of a dominant firm allows the group to choose a non-circuitous 
structure. The coefficient of the family ownership of the holding company is also negative and 
significant at the 5% level in regression (7). These results are all consistent with the control 
hypothesis. The equity proportion of holding company, which proxies the existence of a 
dominant firm in a group, or the listed holding company dummy is not significant in regressions 
(6) and (8).   
On the other hand, in regression (9), the proportion of listed firms is positively correlated 
and significant at the 1% level. This implies that a controlling family prefers to maintain a 
circuitous structure if there are more listed firms, since the circuitous structure allows it to 
secure more control over the group given the smaller family ownership of listed firms. In 
regression (11), where we include all the variables and the control variables of asset size and - 22 -
debt ratio, the above results are confirmed again, while the equity proportion of holding 
company in a group becomes significant, which is consistent with the control hypothesis. The 
overall results support the control hypothesis. 
In Panel B of Table 7, we show the regression results that test the risk diversification and the 
vertical integration hypothesis. The basic conjecture is that a higher investment risk of a 
controlling family would lead to a less circuitous ownership structure, while the incentive for 
increasing the operating efficiency of a group might lead to a circuitous structure despite 
increasing investment risk. In regression (7), family ownership has a significant and negative 
coefficient, so that larger investments by the controlling family lead to non-circuitous ownership 
of a well-diversified portfolio, supporting the risk diversification hypothesis. However, the 
number of business lines, which proxies a well diversified portfolio, is negatively correlated 
with a circuitous structure, with the significance at the 5% level, which does not support the risk 
diversification hypothesis. It suggests that the more business areas the group is operating in, the 
more the group tends to have independent subgroups of member firms. 
Regressions (8) through (12) test the tunnelling/propping hypothesis and the functioning of 
a group structure as an internal capital market. The coefficient of affiliated ownership, which 
proxies the wedge between the cash right and the control right of a controlling family, is 
positive and significant at the 1% level, supporting the tunnelling hypothesis again.
 The larger 
the wedge is, the stronger incentive the controlling shareholder has to divert corporate resources 
away for his private benefit of control, which can be done more easily under a circuitous 
structure. The positive and significant coefficient of the proportion of listed member firms in a 
group is also consistent with the tunnelling hypothesis, since listing a firm increases the wedge 
between the cash right and the control right of the controlling shareholder, and a circuitous 
structure is preferred.   
The propping hypothesis is not strongly supported in the regression models. In regression 
(9), the standard deviation of the ROAs of member firms in a group, which we include to test 
whether a difference in performance would lead to a circuitous structure for propping purposes, 
is not significant. The proportion of financial firms in a group and the amount of free cash flow 
are not correlated with the circuitous structure either. In conclusion, the regression results on the 
choice of circuitous structure are more consistent with the tunnelling hypothesis than with the 
propping hypothesis. On the other hand, in regression (12), the coefficient of debt ratio is 
negative and significant, which is not consistent with the internal capital market hypothesis, but 
rather supports the risk diversification hypothesis. We expected that the larger the leverage is, 
the more a group would prefer a circuitous structure that provides more equity capital for each 
member firm. Bur the result suggests that higher financial risk would lead to more independent 
ownership structure in a group to contain the risk of a domino of financial failures.   
 
5.3. Decision regarding the Position of Member Firms 
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In this section, we show the empirical results of the analyses of the positions of member 
firms in a group. 
Table 8 shows the results of empirical analyses where we regress the location index of 
member firms on their firm characteristics, and test the control hypothesis. In regressions (1) 
and (2), listing dummy and family ownership both show positive coefficients, significant at the 
1% level, and supporting the control hypothesis. The higher the family ownership is, the more 
likely it is that a member firm will be located on a higher level of a pyramid, so that the 
controlling family can maximize its control rights through a chain of investments in the stocks 
of subsidiaries. Listed companies located on higher levels of a pyramid also allow the 
controlling family to minimize the required capital for securing control. 
The positive coefficients of asset size in regressions (3) and (4), which are significant at the 
1% level, also support the control hypothesis. The larger the firm is, the more likely it is to be 
located on the higher level of a pyramid to own and control other subsidiaries.   
In regressions (4) through (6), we add ROA, EBITDA, debt ratio and the number of years in 
business. The negative coefficient of debt ratio supports the control hypothesis since financially 
weak firm cannot be utilized to control other member firms. ROA and EBITDA have negative 
coefficients, both significant at the 1% level. The result implies that member firms which 
perform well and have large liquidity tend to be located on the lower levels, and their resources 
would be tunnelled to member firms located on the higher levels of a group pyramid, of which 
the controlling family tends to own more shares as Attig et al. (2004) conjectured. The result is 
consistent with the tunnelling hypothesis. Years in business has a positive coefficient with a 1% 
significance level, and is consistent with Almeida and Wolfenzon (2004), who argue that new 
firms will be added to their group either horizontally or vertically.   
On the other hand, the negative coefficients of fixed asset growth rates and the standard 
deviation of ROAs in regressions (8) and (9) support the propping hypothesis, which states that 
fast-growing, but risky firms are located on the lower levels of a firm and are supported by 
upstream firms of larger, established member firms. In regressions (10), sales to or purchases 
from affiliated firms have negative coefficients, supporting the propping hypothesis, but lose 
their significance or have their signs reversed when other variables are added in regressions (11) 
through (13). 
In summary, the empirical results are consistent with the control hypothesis, and also 
support the tunnelling or propping hypothesis as we conjectured.   
 
5.4. Decision regarding Circuitous Ownership of Member firms 
 
In this section, we show the empirical results of the test of the factors that affect whether a 
member firm will be located on a circuitous chain of ownership in a group. The dependent 
variable is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a member firm is on a circuitous chain of 
investments, and 0 otherwise.   - 24 -
Table 9 shows the results of empirical tests based on logit analyses. In the tests of the 
control hypothesis in regression (1), family ownership has a positive coefficient, with the 
significance at the 1% level. This implies that the controlling shareholder prefers to place a 
member firm of which he owns more shares on a circuitous chain of ownership, so that he can 
maximize his controlling power. We also conjecture that he owns more of the shares of a 
member firm that is on a circuitous chain of ownership. Another possible interpretation is that 
those firms on the circuitous chain of ownership are key member firms for the control of his 
business group, and the controlling shareholder and affiliated firms tend to own more of the 
shares, even resorting to cross-ownership.   
In regression (2), listing dummy is also positively and significantly correlated with 
circuitous ownership, supporting the control hypothesis. Due to its dispersed ownership 
structure, a listed member firm could be a target of an M&A threat and be better protected 
through the circuitous ownership of other affiliated firms. Asset size and EBITDA also have 
positive coefficients in regressions (3), (4) and (5). The larger a member firm is, the more it 
needs to be protected, or the more it can be used to invest in and protect other member firms 
through circuitous ownership. Debt ratio has a negative coefficient but is not significant. This 
result suggests that expanding the equity base of financially weak member firms is not the main 
reason for the circuitous ownership. Years in business also has a positive and significant 
coefficient, suggesting that old member firms tend to play the important role of a medium for 
securing control over other member firms.   
Regressions (6) through (9) test the tunnelling or risk diversification hypothesis. The 
general conjecture is that member firms that are newly established or financially weak firms will 
be on a circuitous chain and obtain subsidy from other member firms. On the other hand, the 
risk diversification hypothesis conjectures that those firms will be outside the circuitous chain to 
localize any risk related to new business or financial failure. R&D expenses, growth rates of 
fixed assets and the standard deviation of ROAs have negative coefficients, supporting the risk 
diversification hypothesis rather than the tunnelling hypothesis. However, in regressions (10) 
through (12), they lose their significance with other variables added. The negative coefficient of 
sales to affiliated firms in regression (9) also fails to support the tunnelling hypothesis.   
In sum, the empirical results support the control hypothesis and the risk diversification 
hypothesis. Controlling shareholders use a circuitous structure mainly for the purpose of 
securing control, but the tunnelling or internal capital market hypotheses are not supported.   
 
5.5. Simultaneous Regression Models 
 
In the empirical analysis above, we have not considered the endogeneity issues between the 
dependent variables and the independent variables. Especially, family ownership and listing of 
each member firm would be decided simultaneously with the position or circuitous ownership 
of member firms. In this section, we deal with the endogeneity problems by estimating the - 25 -
following simultaneous regression models using the two-stage least square analysis. 
  
Family Ownership = f (Position Index, Circuitous ownership dummy, Listing dummy, Ln 
(Assets), ROA, SD of ROAs, Investment in equities, year dummy, group 
dummy, industry dummy) 
 
Position Index = g (Family ownership, Circuitous ownership dummy, Listing dummy, Ln 
(Assets), Debt ratio, EBITDA, Fixed asset growth rates, Ln (Years in Business), 
year dummy, group dummy, industry dummy) 
 
Circuitous Ownership Dummy = h (Family ownership, Position Index, Listing dummy, Ln 
(Assets), Debt ratio, EBITDA, Ln (Years in Business), year dummy, group 
dummy, industry dummy) 
 
Listing Dummy = I (Family ownership, Position Index, , Ln (Assets), ROA, , Ln (Years in 
Business), year dummy, group dummy, industry dummy) 
 
The equation for family ownership is based on Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Jang, Kang, 
and Park (2004). The explanatory variables include position index, circuitous ownership dummy, 
listing dummy, and investment in equities among others. The equations for position index and 
circuitous ownership dummy are based on the previous models of this paper. Finally, the 
equation for listing dummy includes asset size, profitability (ROA), and years in business as its 
explanatory variables.   
Table 10 shows the results of the empirical tests. Family ownership is higher when a 
member firm is located at a higher level of a group pyramid and when it is more profitable, 
while it is lower when it is listed. The results support the control hypothesis.   
A member firm is located at a higher level of a pyramid when its family ownership is larger, 
and when it is listed and financially stable with a large asset size and a low debt ratio. On the 
other hand, a member firm is located at a lower level when it shows a fast growth. The results 
are consistent with the control hypothesis and the propping hypothesis.   
A member firm is listed when it has been in business for a long time and it is more 
profitable. A member firm has a cross ownership with other member firms when it is listed and 
liquid, but has a high debt ratio. The positive correlation between debt ratio or liquidity and the 
cross ownership supports the control hypothesis and the propping hypothesis again. Over all, the 





This paper has examined the structure of business groups. We investigated the factors that 
affect a controlling shareholder’s decision regarding the structure of his business group and the 
location of its member firms, using financial and ownership data on conglomerate groups in 
Korea.  
We empirically confirmed that controlling shareholders strategically choose the structure of - 26 -
their business groups to secure control over the groups and to seek private benefit of control. 
The risk diversification incentive of controlling shareholders was also found to affect the 
decision. We found that controlling shareholders prefer a vertical group rather than a horizontal 
group for the purpose of securing their control when their family ownerships are lower, there is 
no dominant holding company, and member firms are mostly listed. On the other hand, higher 
investment risk leads to a more horizontal structure. The pursuit of higher operation efficiency 
through vertical integration in groups with a more concentrated business portfolio was also 
confirmed.  
We also found that member firms with higher family ownership and larger asset size tend to 
be located on the higher levels of a group pyramid, again supporting the control hypothesis. On 
the other hand, firms with higher profitability or liquidity are located on the lower levels, 
supporting the tunnelling hypothesis while the fact that riskier member firms are located on the 
lower levels of a group pyramid supports the propping or risk diversification hypothesis. We 
also checked the results using simultaneous models to accommodate the endogeneity problem 
among variables. The overall results strongly support the control hypothesis, while the propping 
or risk diversification hypothesis is also supported with varying degrees. 
The empirical results of the paper are mostly consistent with the existing theories, which 
argue that the main purpose of a pyramidal group structure is to secure the control of controlling 
shareholders and to maximize their private benefit of control.     
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<Table 1> Selection of Sample Groups   
































1997  804 (30)  0 (0)  101  70  101  89  443 (30)  143  55.1
1998  686 (30)  0 (0)  93  64  87  68  374 (30)  126  54.5
1999  544 (30)  30 (6)  78  33  54  24  325 (24)  104  59.7
2000  624 (30)  32 (5)  79  56  40  22  395 (25)  100  63.3
2001  704 (43)  62 (12)  78  77  24  17  446 (31)  105  63.4
2002  841 (49)  98 (14)  85  106  34  26  492 (35)  116  58.5
2003  892 (51)  109 (15)  78  125  67  25  488 (36)  120  54.7
Total  5,095 (263)  331 (52)  592  531  407  271  2,963 (211)  814  58.2- 30 -
<Table 2> Summary Statistics of Group Structure 
The sample includes 211 business groups (unbalanced panel) over the period 1997 through 2003. Vertical index is (1-
(Total number of direct investments)/(Total number of direct and indirect investments)). Circuitous index I is the ratio 
of the number of firms on circuitous chains of ownership to the number of firms in a group, and Circuitous index II is 
the ratio of the number of direct and indirect investments by the member firms on circuitous chains of ownership to 
the number of direct and indirect investments by all member firms. Family ownership is the sum of ownerships by a 
controlling shareholder and his family members, and affiliated ownership is the sum of ownerships by affiliated 
companies. Inside ownership is the sum of family and affiliated ownerships. Weighted averages are weighted by the 
equity portion of each member firm in a group. The number of business lines is based on the two-digit industrial 
classification, and the industrial concentration is 1-(Number of business lines/Number of member firms). Group ROA 
is the ratio of total net income to total assets of a group excluding financial companies. Standard deviation of group 
ROAs is the standard deviation of group ROAs over year -4 through year 0. Herfindahl index is the sum of the 
squares of the proportion of each member firm’s equity in the total equities of a group. Standard deviations of cash 
flow rights is the standard deviation of cash flow rights of all member firms in a group, where cash flow rights are 
calculated fully reflecting the direct and indirect ownerships of the controlling family in a group. Standard deviations 
of ROAs are the standard deviations of ROAs of member firms in a group excluding financial companies. Free cash 
flow is the ratio of the sum of operating income and depreciation to total assets in a group excluding financial 
companies, and the equity investment of holding company is the ratio of the equity held by the holding company to 
the total equity of a group, where the holding company is the member firm that has the largest equity investment in 
the group. Debt ratio is the ratio of debt to total assets of a group.
Variables Average  Median  Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Vertical  Index  0.5698 0.6390 0.2492 0.0000 0.9123 
Circuitous Index    0.1634 0.1500 0.1686 0.0000 0.7273 
Simple Average of Inside Ownerships  0.6848 0.6889 0.0988 0.3226 0.9865 
Simple Average of Family ownerships 0.1288  0.1038  0.0981  0.0116  0.4970 
Simple Average of Affiliated Ownerships  0.5310  0.5475  0.1141  0.1375  0.7372 
Weighted Average of Inside Ownerships  0.4867 0.4861 0.1336 0.1775 0.9760 
Weighted Average of Family ownerships   0.0988  0.0752  0.0740  0.0111  0.3646 
Weighted Average of Affiliated Ownerships  0.3766  0.3890  0.1320  0.0447  0.7216 
Number of Member Firms 22.5261  19.0000  13.4940  4.0000  64.0000 
Number of Business Lines  11.9052  12.0000 4.7480  2.0000 29.0000 
Industrial Concentration  0.4139 0.4118 0.1469 0.0000 0.7368 
Group ROA  -0.0002  0.0101  0.0668  -0.5063  0.1256 
SD of Group ROAs  0.0300  0.0231  0.0261  0.0023  0.2271 
Herfindahl Index of a group  0.2292 0.1854 0.1540 0.0473 0.7973 
SD of Cash Flow Rights of Controlling 
Families  0.1884 0.1914 0.0886 0.0155 0.4295 
SD of firm ROAs  0.1917  0.0961  0.4324  0.0024  5.4489 
Free Cash Flow  0.0529  0.0513  0.0357  -0.0965  0.1705 
Equity Investments of Holding  Company 0.2150 0.2013 0.1046 0.0240 0.7009 
Family ownership in Holding Company  0.1786 0.1626 0.1576 0.0000 0.9999 
Listed Holding Company Dummy  0.9147 1.0000 0.2800 0.0000 1.0000 
Proportion of Listed Member Firms  0.2062 0.1905 0.1009 0.0000 0.4857 
Proportion of Financial Companies  0.1200 0.0952 0.1154 0.0000 0.6000 
Total Assets(Billion Wons)    13,284.90 4,926.00 18899.30 958.00 87,555.00
Ln  (Total  Assets)  8.8258 8.5023 1.0575 6.8648  11.3800 
Debt  Ratio  0.6737 0.6477 0.1790 0.1872 1.3969 - 31 - 
<Table 3> Trends of Group Data 
See Table 2 for the definitions of the variables. The test of difference is between the current and previous years, using t-statistics for the averages and Wilcoxon z-statistics for the 
medians. a, b and c denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.   
Year 1997  Year 1998  Year 1999  Year 2000  Year 2001  Year 2002  Year 2003  Variables
Average Median Average Median Average Median Average Median Average Median Average Median Average Median
Vertical Index  0.669  0.715  0.567
c 0.631 0.580 0.674 0.581 0.657 0.525 0.623 0.548 0.631 0.534 0.575 
Circuitous Index  0.160  0.154  0.121 0.043 0.180 0.163 0.174 0.156 0.166 0.145 0.173 0.156 0.172 0.137 
Weighted Average of Family 
ownerships   0.098 0.085 0.075 0.059 0.078 0.051 0.085 0.058 0.109 0.100 0.118 0.097 0.114 0.103 
Weighted Average of Affiliated 
ownerships   0.344 0.332 0.380 0.397 0.355 0.372 0.378 0.375 0.378 0.418 0.386 0.432 0.404 0.426 
Number of Member Firms  26.800  22.500 22.867 18.000
c 21.333 18.500 23.600 19.000 20.645 17.000 21.171 17.000 21.667 16.500
Number of Business Lines  14.600  14.000 12.900 12.500
b 12.083 11.000 12.160 12.000 10.581 10.000 10.743 10.000 10.806 10.000
Industrial Concentration  0.421  0.405 0.385 0.387 0.388 0.390 0.431 0.421 0.415 0.423 0.421 0.455 0.430 0.461 
SD of Group ROAs  0.016  0.010  0.032
b 0.021 0.029 0.022 0.032 0.023 0.033 0.031 0.040 0.029 0.027  0.023c
Herfindahl Index of a group  0.166  0.140  0.192  0.172  0.237 0.182 0.230 0.190 0.259 0.195 0.260 0.207 0.251 0.216 
SD of Cash Flow Rights of 
Controlling Families  0.209 0.212 0.186 0.168 0.189 0.177 0.174 0.154 0.172 0.167 0.197 0.211
c 0.189 0.202 
SD of firm ROAs  0.219  0.083  0.235  0.174
b 0.326 0.084 0.173 0.111 0.139 0.111 0.191 0.084 0.103 0.085 
Free Cash Flow  0.052  0.053  0.033
b 0.040 0.048 0.046 0.056 0.051 0.051 0.052 0.058 0.061 0.068 0.066 
Equity Investments of Holding 
Company  0.167 0.160 0.222
b 0.185 0.201 0.191 0.211 0.204 0.227 0.208 0.220 0.212 0.246 0.235 
Family ownership in Holding 
Company  0.150 0.090 0.148 0.103 0.129 0.120 0.163 0.182 0.196 0.184 0.193 0.217 0.243 0.238 
Listed Holding Company 
Dummy  0.867 1.000 0.900 1.000 0.958 1.000 0.960 1.000 0.936 1.000 0.914 1.000 0.889 1.000 
Proportion of Listed Member 
Firms  0.222 0.197 0.229 0.212 0.226 0.211 0.204 0.176 0.192 0.172 0.181 0.167 0.199 0.184 
Proportion of Financial 
Companies  0.119 0.119 0.120 0.118 0.136 0.117 0.123 0.111 0.132 0.095 0.116 0.087 0.102 0.070 
Ln  (Total  Assets)  8.962 8.640 8.990 8.618 9.011 8.644 9.064 8.583 8.678 8.359 8.586 8.314 8.648 8.424 
Debt  Ratio  0.853 0.825 0.829 0.773 0.664
a 0.628
a 0.620 0.619 0.612 0.606 0.601 0.597 0.563 0.568 
Number  of  samples  30 30 24 25 31 35 36 - 32 - 
<Table 4> Summary Statistics of Member Firms 
The sample includes 2,963 firms (unbalanced panel) over the period 1997 through 2003. The location of a firm in a 
group (position index) is the ratio of the number of direct and indirect investments in other member firms to the sum 
of the number of direct and indirect investments in other member firms and the number of direct and indirect 
ownerships of the firm by other member firms. Circuitous ownership dummy takes a value of 1 if a firm is on a 
circuitous chain of investments, and 0 otherwise. Family ownership is the sum of ownerships of a controlling 
shareholder and his family members, and affiliated ownership is the sum of ownerships of affiliated companies. 
Inside ownership is the sum of family, executive and affiliated ownerships. Investment in equity is the ratio of the 
equity investment of a firm to the total equity investments of member firms in a group. R&D is the ratio of R&D 
expenses to total assets. Fixed asset growth rate at t is the ratio of fixed assets at t minus fixed assets at t-1 to fixed 
assets at t-1. Standard deviation of ROAs is the standard deviation of ROAs of a firm over year -4 through year 0. 
ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. EBITDA is the ratio of the sum of operating income and depreciation to 
total assets and debt ratio is the ratio of debt to total assets. Sales to affiliated firms or purchases from affiliated firms 
are relative to the total sales of a firm. 
 
Variables  Number of 
Samples  Average Median Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Position Index  2,963  0.2997 0.0000 0.4049 0.0000 1.0000 
Number of Indirect Investments 2,963  4,691.0  0.0000  41,364.7 0.0000 857,100 
Number of Direct Investments 2,963  512.8  0.0000  4,067.2 0.0000 79,940 
Circuitous Dummy  2,963  0.2173 0.0000 0.4125 0.0000 1.0000 
Inside Ownership  2,963  0.6533 0.6501 0.2962 0.0000 1.0000 
Family ownership  2,963  0.0923 0.0000 0.1796 0.0000 1.0000 
Affiliated Ownership  2,963  0.5450 0.5000 0.3309 0.0000 1.0000 
Investment in Equities  2,963  0.0624 0.0001 0.1643 0.0000 1.0000 
Assets (million won)  2,963  907,433.67 114,349.98 2485463.89 49.0980 39,203,381
Ln (Assets)  2,963  18.6850  18.5548  2.1317  10.8016  24.3920 
Debt Ratio  2,963  0.5976 0.6317 0.2338 0.0000 0.9982 
ROA 2,963  0.0040  0.0164  0.1592  -2.8037  0.8718 
EBITDA 2,963  0.0460  0.0535  0.1625  -3.3694  2.1647 
Years in Business  2,963 17.5301  14.0927  14.5794  0.0001  79.0230 
Ln (Years in Business)  2,963  2.1824  2.6457  1.6796  -9.2103  4.3697 
R&D 2,963  0.0033  0.0000  0.0111  0.0000  0.1482 
Fixed Asset Growth Rates  2,744 0.5273  0.0634  3.1409  -0.9951  78.3814 
SD of ROAs  2,190  0.0521  0.0322  0.0692  0.0001  0.7848 
Sales to Affiliated firms  2,610  0.2645 0.1214 0.3138 0.0000 1.0000 
Purchase from Affiliated firms  2,610  0.1231 0.0445 0.1938 0.0000 1.0000 
Listing Dummy  2,963  0.2747 0.0000 0.4464 0.0000 1.0000 - 33 - 
<Table 5> A Comparison of Listed and Non-Listed Member Firms 
The sample includes 2,963 firms, of which 814 are listed firms and 2,149 are non-listed firms. See <Table 12> for the 
definitions of the variables. The test of difference uses t-statistics for the averages and Wilcoxon z-statistics for the 
medians.  
 
Listed Firms  Non-listed Firms  Test of difference (p-value)
Variables 
Average Median Average Median Average Median 
Position  Index  0.6514 0.8578 0.1665 0.0000 <.0001 <.0001 
Circuitous Dummy  0.4865 0.0000 0.1154 0.0000 <.0001 <.0001 
Inside  Ownership  0.3435 0.3097 0.7707 0.8507 <.0001 <.0001 
Family ownership  0.0977 0.0397 0.0903 0.0000  0.223  <.0001 
Affiliated ownership  0.2326 0.2102 0.6634 0.6669 <.0001 <.0001 
Investment in Equities  0.1931 0.0690 0.0129 0.0000 <.0001 <.0001 
Ln (Assets)  20.7975  20.8502  17.8849  17.8072  <.0001  <.0001 
Debt  ratio  0.6287 0.6408 0.5858 0.6236 <.0001  0.013 
ROA 0.0114  0.0146  0.0012  0.0171  0.035  0.121 
EBITDA  0.0640 0.0608 0.0392 0.0479 <.0001 <.0001 
Ln (Years in Business)  3.3293  3.4347  1.7480  2.2086  <.0001  <.0001 
R&D  0.0028 0.0003 0.0034 0.0000  0.112  <.0001 
Fixed Asset Growth Rates  0.1515 0.0498 0.6839 0.0700 <.0001  0.121 
SD of ROAs  0.0415  0.0221  0.0580  0.0402  <.0001  <.0001 
Sales to Affiliated firms  0.1590 0.0838 0.3098 0.1672 <.0001 <.0001 
Purchase from Affiliated firms  0.1077 0.0550 0.1297 0.0385  0.002  <.0001 - 34 - 
<Table 6> The Choice of Vertical versus Horizontal Structure   
We use random effects model of panel analysis reflecting cross-sectional factors and time-series factors in the error terms. The dependent variable is vertical index, which is defined 
as 1-(Total number of direct investments)/(Total number of direct and indirect investments)). The numbers in parentheses denote z-values, and ***, ** and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
(Panel A) Test of the Control hypothesis 
Family ownership is the sum of ownerships of a controlling shareholder and his family members, and affiliated ownership is the sum of ownerships of affiliated companies. Weighted 
averages are weighted by the equity portion of a firm in a group. The number of business lines is based on the two-digit industrial classification, and the industrial concentration is 1-
(Number of business lines/Number of member firms). Herfindahl index is the sum of the squares of the proportion of each member firm in the total equities of a group. The equity 
investments of holding company is the ratio of the equity held by the holding company to the total equity of a group, where the holding company is the member firm that has the 
largest equity investments in the group. Debt ratio is the ratio of debt to total assets of a group.
 
Regressions  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 






















Weighted Average of 
Family ownerships 
-0.8313 
(-3.29)***     -0.5081 
(-2.16)**        -0.1036 
(-0.48) 
Weighted Average of 
Affiliated ownerships    0.4123 
(4.34)***           1.0926 
(8.79)***
Number of Member Firms     0.0079 
(7.49)***
0.0062 
(4.79)***        
Herfindahl Index of a 
group       -0.5400 




Equity Proportion of 
Holding Company        -0.3011 




Family ownerships in 
Holding Company         -0.0744 
(-0.91)      -0.0893 
(-1.30) 
Listed Holding Company 
Dummy          -0.0414 
(-0.84)     
Proportion of Listed 






Ln (Total Assets)        0.0372 




Debt ratio        0.0116 





2  0.3157 0.1178 0.3320 0.4196 0.2552 0.0822 0.0943 0.0063 0.2086 0.4497 0.6770 - 35 - 
(Panel B) Test of the Risk Diversification, the Vertical Integration and the Tunnelling Hypothesis 
Family ownership is the sum of ownerships by a controlling shareholder and his family members, and affiliated ownership is the sum of ownerships by affiliated companies. 
Weighted averages are weighted by the equity portion in a group. Standard deviation of group ROAs is the standard deviation of group ROAs over year -4 through year 0. The 
number of business lines is based on the two-digit industrial classification, and the industrial concentration is 1-(Number of business lines/Number of member firms). Standard 
deviations of cash flow rights are the standard deviations of cash flow rights of all member firms in a group, where cash flow rights are calculated fully reflecting the direct and 
indirect ownerships of the controlling family in a group. Standard deviations of ROAs are the standard deviations of ROAs of member firms in a group excluding financial companies. 
Free cash flow is the ratio of the sum of operating income and depreciation to total assets in a group excluding financial companies. Debt ratio is the ratio of debt to total assets of a 
group.
 
  Risk diversification / Vertical Integration  Tunnelling or Propping/Internal Capital Market 
Regressions  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
























Weighted Average of 
Family ownership          -0.6965 
(-3.00)***
     -0.1775
(-0.69) 
Weighted Average of 
Affiliated ownership                0.3729 
(3.89)*** 
SD of Group ROAs  -1.8084 








     
Number of Business Lines    0.0192 
(6.51)***    0.0115 
(3.12)***
  0.0084 
(2.40)** 
     
Industrial Concentration      0.6505 




     
SD of Cash Flow Rights of 
Controlling Families          0.0116 
(0.07)      0.0602 
(0.38) 
SD of firm ROAs                  0.0249 
(1.00)     0.0116 
(0.48) 
Free  Cash  Flow              0.4109 
(1.15)    0.1947 
(0.58) 
Proportion of Financial 




Proportion of Listed 
Member Firms                  0.3820 
(2.27)**







(0.89)       0.0945 
(4.86)*** 







(0.65)       0.0964 
(1.20) 
R
2  0.0047 0.3214 0.2281 0.2739 0.3439 0.3690 0.4871  0.0137 0.0003 0.0017 0.0433 0.4202 - 36 - 
<Table 7> The Choice of Circuitous Structure 
We use random effects model of panel analysis reflecting cross-sectional factors and time-series factors in the error terms. The dependent variable is vertical index, which is defined 
as (Total number of direct investments)/(Total number of direct and indirect investments)). The numbers in parentheses denote z-values and, ***, ** and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
(Panel A) The Test of the Control Hypothesis  
Family ownership is the sum of ownerships by a controlling shareholder and his family members, and affiliated ownership is the sum of ownerships by affiliated companies. 
Weighted averages are weighted by the equity portion in a group. The number of business lines is based on the two-digit industrial classification, and the industrial concentration is 1-
(Number of business lines/Number of member firms). Herfindahl index is the sum of the squares of the proportion of each member firm in the total equities of a group. The equity 
investments of holding company is the ratio of the equity held by the holding company to the total equity of a group, where the holding company is the member firm that has the 
largest equity investments in the group. Debt ratio is the ratio of debt to total assets of a group.
 
Regressions  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 






















Weighted Average of 
Family ownership 
-0.5401 
(-2.63)***     -0.5984 
(-2.73)***        0.0025 
(0.01) 
Weighted Average of 
Affiliated ownership    0.3214 
(3.83)***
         0.7759 
(6.32)***
Number of Member Firms     -0.0004 
(-0.40) 
-0.0015 
(-1.19)         
Herfindahl Index of a 
group       -0.2055 
(-2.47)**




Equity Proportion of 
Holding Company        -0.0461 




Family ownership in 
Holding Company         -0.1680 
(-2.44)**
    -0.2278 
(-3.33)***
Listed Holding Company 
Dummy          -0.0772 
(-1.82)* 
   
Proportion of Listed 






Ln  (Total  Assets)      0.0105 




Debt  ratio      -0.1632 
(-2.36) **





2  0.1131 0.0449 0.0228 0.1214 0.0899 0.0447 0.0662 0.0128 0.1855 0.2454 0.4142 - 37 - 
(Panel B) Test of the Risk Diversification, the Vertical Integration and the Tunnelling Hypothesis 
Family ownership is the sum of ownerships by a controlling shareholder and his family members, and affiliated ownership is the sum of ownerships by affiliated companies. 
Weighted averages are weighted by the equity portion in a group. Standard deviation of group ROAs is the standard deviation of group ROAs over year -4 through year 0. The 
number of business lines is based on the two-digit industrial classification, and the industrial concentration is 1-(Number of business lines/Number of member firms). Standard 
deviations of cash flow rights are the standard deviations of cash flow rights of all member firms in a group, where cash flow rights are calculated fully reflecting the direct and 
indirect ownerships of the controlling family in a group. Standard deviations of ROAs are the standard deviations of ROAs of member firms in a group excluding financial companies. 
Free cash flow is the ratio of the sum of operating income and depreciation to total assets in a group excluding financial companies. Debt ratio is the ratio of debt to total assets of a 
group.
 
  Risk diversification / Vertical Integration  Tunnelling or Propping and Internal Capital Market 
Regressions  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
























Weighted Average of 
Family ownership           -0.6822 
(-3.03)***      -0.2593
(-1.15) 
Weighted Average of 
Affiliated ownership                    0.2873 
(3.24)*** 
SD of Group ROAs  -0.3392 







(-1.78)*       
Number of Business Lines    -0.0033 
(-1.21)     -0.0066 
(-1.91)*    -0.0080 
(-2.29)**      
Industrial Concentration      0.1414 
(1.64)     0.1108 
(1.16) 
0.1457 
(1.54)       
SD of Cash Flow Rights of 
Controlling Families          -0.1938
(-1.36)      -0.0895
(-0.63) 
SD of firm ROAs                  -0.0090
(-0.40)     -0.0055
(-0.24) 
Free  Cash  Flow              -0.1539
(-0.49)    -0.3532
(-1.14) 
Proportion of Financial 




Proportion of Listed 
Member Firms                  0.3624 
(2.41)**







(0.30)       -0.0095
(-0.56) 







(-1.44)       -0.1211
(-1.67)*
R
2  0.0050 0.0273 0.0308 0.0263 0.0222 0.0280 0.1181 0.0128  0.0065  0.0115  0.0929  0.2658 
 - 38 - 
<Table 8> The Determinants of a Firm’s Location in a Group 
We use a total sample of 2,963 firms over the period 1997 through 2003. The dependent variable is the location of a firm in a group (position index), which is the ratio of the number 
of direct and indirect investments in other member firms to the sum of the number of direct and indirect investments in other member firms and the number of direct and indirect 
ownerships of the firm by other member firms. Family ownership is the sum of ownerships by a controlling shareholder and his family members. ROA is the ratio of net income to 
total assets. EBITDA is the ratio of the sum of operating income and depreciation to total assets and debt ratio is the ratio of debt to total assets. Listing dummy takes a value of 1 if a 
member firm is listed, and 0 otherwise. R&D is the ratio of R&D expenses to total assets. Fixed asset growth rate at t is the ratio of fixed assets at t minus fixed assets at t-1 to fixed 
assets at t-1. Standard deviations of ROAs are the standard deviations of ROAs of firms over the past five years. Sales to affiliated firms or purchases from affiliated firms are relative 
to the total sales of a firm. Each regression model includes industrial dummy, year dummy and group dummy. The numbers in parentheses denote heteroskedasticity-consistent t-
values, and ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Regressions  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 


























Listing Dummy  0.4987 
(30.25)*** 
    0.2746 
(14.74)***
0.2767 






Family ownership    0.7379 
(16.78)*** 
   0.6085 
(16.61)***
0.6030 






ROA         -0.1213
(-4.63)***       -0.1117 
(-3.62)***    
EBITDA       -0.0963
(-3.96)***   -0.0614
(-2.58)***       -0.0437
(-1.62)   













Debt  ratio       -0.1342
(-5.32)***
-0.1280






Ln (Years in 
Business)        0.0111 
(3.00)***
0.0109 






R&D          -0.5395 
(-0.95)      -0.3310
(-0.82) 
-0.2178
(-0.53)   
Fixed Asset Growth 
Rate           -0.0029
(-2.05)**      -0.0022
(-0.68) 
SD of ROAs             -0.8555
(-6.31)***     -0.2624
(-2.49)** 
Sales to Affiliated 


















2  0.3937 0.2490 0.4328 0.4340 0.5531 0.5516 0.1587 0.1637 0.1812 0.1893 0.5508 0.5495 0.5472 
Number of samples 2,963  2,963  2,963  2,963  2,963 2,963 2,963 2,744 2,190 2,610 2,610 2,610 2,050 - 39 - 
<Table 9> Logistic Regression of Circuitous Ownership 
We use a total sample of 2,963 firms over the period 1997 through 2003. The dependent variable is the circuitous dummy that takes a value of 1 if a firm is on a circuitous chain of 
investments, and 0 otherwise. Family ownership is the sum of ownerships by a controlling shareholder and his family members. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. 
EBITDA is the ratio of the sum of operating income and depreciation to total assets and debt ratio is the ratio of debt to total assets. Listing dummy takes a value of 1 if a member 
firm is listed, and 0 otherwise. R&D is the ratio of R&D expenses to total assets. Fixed asset growth rate at t is the ratio of fixed assets at t minus fixed assets at t-1 to fixed assets at t-
1. Standard deviations of ROAs are the standard deviations of ROAs of firms over the past five years. Sales to affiliated firms or purchases from affiliated firms are relative to the 
total sales of a firm. Each regression model includes industrial dummy, year dummy and group dummy. The numbers in parentheses denote heteroskedasticity-consistent z-values, 
and ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Regressions  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
























Listing Dummy  2.3924 










Family ownership      2.4757 










ROA         -1.0405 
(-1.38)         -1.0160 
(-1.13)     
EBITDA         1.3895 
(2.97)***
      1.3991 
(3.06)***
 
































R&D         -9.6915 





Fixed Asset Growth 
Rate          -0.0733 
(-2.12)**      -0.0156 
(-0.52) 
SD of ROAs            -5.0388 
(-3.24)***      -0.5575 
(-0.38) 


















2  0.3571 0.2691 0.4393 0.4707 0.4712 0.2504 0.2520 0.2609 0.2656 0.4577 0.4584 0.4357 
Number of samples 2,963  2,963  2,963  2,963 2,963 2,963 2,744 2,190 2,610 2,610 2,610 2,050 
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<Table 10> Two-Stage Least Square Analysis of Family Ownership, Firm Position, Listing Dummy and Circuitous Ownership Dummy 
Family ownership is the sum of ownerships of a controlling shareholder and his family members. Position index is the ratio of the number of direct and indirect investments in other 
member firms to the sum of the number of direct and indirect investments in other member firms and the number of direct and indirect ownerships of the firm by other member firms. 
Circuitous ownership dummy takes a value of 1 if a firm is on a circuitous chain of investments, and 0 otherwise. Listing dummy takes a value of 1 if a member firm is listed, and 0 
otherwise. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. EBITDA is the ratio of the sum of operating income and depreciation to total assets and debt ratio is the ratio of debt to total 
assets. Fixed asset growth rate at t is the ratio of fixed assets at t minus fixed assets at t-1 to fixed assets at t-1. Standard deviations of ROAs are the standard deviations of ROAs of 
firms over the past five years. Investment in equity is the ratio of the equity investment of a firm to the total equity investments of member firms in a group. Sales to affiliated firms or 
purchases from affiliated firms are relative to the total sales of a firm. 
In the first stage of the two-stage Least Square analysis, we estimate the expected values or probabilities of endogenous variables regressing endogenous ones on all exogenous ones, 
and regressing endogenous variables on estimated expected values (probabilities) and exogenous variables in the second stage. Each regression model includes industrial dummies, 
year dummies and group dummies. The numbers in parentheses denote heteroskedasticity-consistent t-values in OLS regressions and z-values in logit regressions, and ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 Simple  regressions Simultaneous equation regressions (2-SLS) 
 OLS  regression  Logistic regression  OLS regression Logistic  regression 
Regressions  (1) Family 






































Position Index  0.1799 









Listing dummy  -0.0678 
(-6.22)*** 
0.1741 





(5.54)***    1.0853 
(2.71)*** 
Circuitous ownership Dummy  -0.0189 
(-1.41) 
0.3707 
(20.08)***      0.0281 
(1.00) 
0.3139 
(6.85)***     
















Debt ratio    -0.0944 
(-2.65)***    0.9951 
(1.74)*    -0.2202 
(-4.61)***    1.1274 
(1.98)** 
ROA  0.0910  
(3.12)***    -0.0741 
(-0.10)    0.0939  
(2.96)***    1.8896 
(2.35)**   
EBITDA   0.0235 
(0.70)    1.5769 
(3.04)***    -0.0407 
(-0.82)    1.6504 
(3.17)*** 
SD of ROAs  0.0124 
(0.24)      0.0147 
(0.27)     
Fixed Asset Growth Rate    -0.0010 
(-0.43)      -0.0125 
(-2.96)***    
Investment in Equities  0.0546 
(2.77)***       0.0690 
(1.45)       












2 0.3134  0.6437  0.6857  0.5935  0.2397 0.5138 0.6747 0.4433 
Number of samples  2,190  2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190 
* Pseudo R
2 in logit regressions- 41 - 
<Appendix 1> Examples of Group Structures 
 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
†
 
-   G r o u p   S t r u c t u r e                                               -   P o s i t i o n   o f   M e m b e r   F i r m s  
Group Structures  Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4  Group Structures Firm A  Firm B  Firm C  Firm D  Firm E 
Vertical Structure  0.6  0.2  0.77  0.69  Case 1  1  0.75  0.50  0.25  0 
Circuitous Structure  0  0  0.80  0.60  Case  2  1  0  0 0.50 0 
       Case 3  0.70  0.67  0.63  0.57  0 


















Firm- 42 - 










































Hyundai Group 72,415  10,670  0.853  62  26 23  0.371  0.116  0.430  0.907  0.290 
Samsung Group 63,536  13,492  0.788  61  40 14  0.230  0.023  0.413  0.824  0.148 
Daewoo Group 51,791  9,055  0.825  37  29 12  0.324  0.048  0.331  0.707  0.081 
LG Group  51,435  8,491  0.835  52  22  14 0.269  0.046  0.370  0.873  0.250 
SK Group  29,019  5,109  0.824  45  33  8 0.178  0.090  0.328  0.832  0.200 
 











































Samsung 81,171  51,881  0.361  63  44  14 0.222  0.014  0.389  0.851  0.143 
CJ 4,603  2,212  0.519  41  28  2  0.049 0.091 0.476  0.394  0.000 
Shinsegae 5,220  2,194  0.580  12  6 3  0.250  0.155  0.466  0.211  0.000 
Hyundai Group
Hyundai Motor 51,012  24,487  0.520  27  17 6  0.222  0.032  0.498  0.734  0.185 
Hyundai 
Department Store 3,647 1,787 0.510  17  11  3  0.176 0.124 0.434  0.685  0.294 
Hyundai Heavy 
Industries  14,037 4,044  0.712  6  3  2  0.333 0.058 0.414  0.577  0.500 
Hyundai  5,164 999 0.807  7  2  3  0.429 0.016 0.233  0.500  0.429 




2,770 1,385 0.500  12  6  1  0.083 0.168 0.093  0.222  0.000 
LG Group 
LG 60,050  26,049  0.566  46  37  10  0.217 0.049 0.353  0.330  0.000 - 43 - 
LS 5,056  2,189  0.567  12  7 5  0.417 0.100 0.319  0.381  0.000 
SK Group               
SK 46,035  15,654  0.660  59  48  11  0.186 0.011 0.510  0.810  0.186 
* The Daewoo group went bankrupt in 1999.- 44 - 
<Appendix 3> Correlation Coefficients of Group Variables 
We calculate Pearson correlation coefficients using 211 samples of groups over the period 1997 through 2003, where a, b and c denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
(1)  Vertical  Index  1                       
(2) Circuitous Index  0.693
a  1                       
(3) Weighted Average of 
Family ownership  -0.562
a -0.336
a  1                      
(4) Weighted Average of 
Affiliated ownership  0.343
a 0.212
a -0.315
a 1                     




a 1                    





a 1                   






a 1                  
(8) SD of Group ROAs  -0.069  -0.071  -0.190
a 0.037 -0.046 -0.157
b 0.097 1                








a 0.047 1               
(10) SD of Cash Flow Rights 
of Controlling Families  -0.117
c -0.113 0.255
a 0.114
c -0.028 0.020 -0.044 -0.106 -0.029 1              
(11) SD of firm ROAs  0.018  -0.080  -0.100 0.187
a 0.034 0.054 -0.006 0.202
a 0.022 0.247
a  1            




a -0.020 -0.023 -0.118
c 1          
(13) Equity Proportion of 









a 0.033 1        
(14) Family ownership in 










a -0.099 -0.058 0.271
a 1      
(15) Listed Holding Company 
Dummy  -0.079 -0.113 -0.103 0.090 -0.012 0.012 -0.149
b 0.168
b -0.030 -0.060 0.082 0.087 0.196
a -0.140
b 1     
(16) Proportion of Listed 
Member Firms  0.457
a 0.431
a -0.358
a -0.052 0.041 0.092 -0.047 0.049 -0.208
a -0.311
a -0.043 -0.043 -0.156
b -0.252
a 0.223
a 1     




a 0.105 0.032 -0.015 0.200
a 0.070 -0.135
c -0.214
a -0.040 -0.111 -0.157
b -0.176
b -0.018 0.242
a 1    













c 1  
(19) Debt ratio  0.0003  -0.057  -0.156
b -0.149
b -0.102 0.023 -0.148
b 0.222






b 0.031 1 - 45 - 
<Appendix 4> Correlation Coefficients of Firm Variables 
We calculate the Pearson correlation coefficients using the total sample of 2,963 firms over the period 1997 through 2003, where a, b and c denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17) 
(1)  Position  index  1                  
(2) Circuitous ownership 
dummy  0.612
a  1                  
(3) Inside ownership  -0.421
a -0.217
a  1                 
(4) Family ownership  0.323
a 0.122
a 0.131
a 1                




a 1               




a 1              






a 1             





a 1            
(9) ROA  0.051
a 0.022 -0.010 0.093
a -0.057
a 0.009 0.112
a -0.015 1          








a  1          










a 1         
(12) R&D  -0.055
a -0.042
b 0.001 -0.016 0.014 -0.013 -0.036
c -0.035
c -0.048
a  -0.003 -0.002 1       










a 0.003 1      









a 0.034 0.032 1      







a -0.018 0.029 0.010 -0.175
a 0.061
a 0.041
b 0.005 1    
(16) Purchase from 
affiliated firms  -0.022 0.004 0.045
b -0.024 0.055




b 0.006 0.025 1  
(17) Listing dummy  0.535
a 0.402
a -0.644
a 0.019 -0.581
a 0.490
a 0.610
a 0.082
a 0.029 0.068
a 0.420
a -0.024 -0.077
a -0.114
a -0.220
a -0.052
a 1 